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1. Introduction 
The primary objective of this paper is to present a discussion of the potential 
significance of giant companies in the emerging new information economy. In the 
1970s and discussion of the significance of giant firms would be somewhat 
uncontroversial. Within economics, the work of, for example, Prais (1976) established 
empirically the central position of giant firms in market economies. From a more 
interdisciplinary perspective, theorists (particularly Marxist inspired writers) 
emphasised the development of a monopoly based capitalism (for example, Baran and 
Sweezy, 1968; Cowling, 1982). But more recently these established or stylised facts 
have been questioned. As discussed below, an explicitly small firms literature has 
developed. This literature is frequently linked to claims that the changing dynamics of 
modern market economies have undermined the position and significance of giant 
firms. Other writers, for instance the sociologist Castells (1996) links the very same 
dynamics to a continued role for giant firms in a globalised world. 
 In short, the straightforward and seemingly uncontroversial message based on 
an earlier era of market and historical development has given way to a rather confused 
picture with regard to the functioning and role of giant firms. This lack of clarity is 
the background to the discussion in this paper in which the significance of giant firms 
is considered both theoretically and empirically. The discussion is organised as 
follows. In the next section a simple cost based theoretical framework is developed 
that is used to understand the potential impacts on giant firms of an emerging 
information economy. Here it is argued that while giant firms in the old economy are 
likely to encounter problems that arise because of increasing environmental 
uncertainty there is no single response that might be used by the companies involved. 
In short it is not possible to derive a single evolutionary trajectory for giant firms in 
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the modern economy. This perspective informs the empirically based discussion that 
follows.  
In section three the data used in this paper is introduced. The data set covers 
the 100 largest firms in the UK, (non-UK) EU and USA. The UK and EU are 
separated to allow for the possibility that the recent evolution of giant firms is 
influenced by the ‘type’ of market economy; the principle distinction here being 
between Anglo-Saxon and Continental European versions of capitalism. Analysis is 
based on aggregate concentration ratios. It is shown in appendix two that aggregate 
concentration can be decomposed into four different effects: market power, global 
presence, diversification and industrial structure. This framework allows changes in 
aggregate concentration to be mapped into changes in the role and significance of 
giant companies. In section 3 it is shown that the UK, EU and USA exhibit different 
evolutionary trajectories that can be understood in terms of the theoretical framework 
set out in section 2. The only common feature involves a movement away from what 
is termed ‘old economy dominance’.  
In section four the empirical analysis is further developed to take account of 
the changing structure of the population of giant firms. Here it is shown that, on the 
one hand, EU and, on the other, UK and US entrants into the population of giant firms 
appear to have different characteristics compared to continuing firms. Part of a 
possible explanation identified in section four involves the overwhelming significance 
of new giant financial firms in the EU and giant financial and retailing firms in the 
UK and USA. It is speculated that such firms are structurally part of the ‘old 
economy’ rather than a new information based economy.  
This finding, of an increasing significance of ‘old economy’ giant firms, begs 
the question as to how we might define the term ‘new information economy’. Rather 
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than attempt a single definition, a more useful approach in the current context is to 
present three alternatives: narrow, broad and systemic. A narrow definition views the 
information economy in technical terms as the information and communication 
technologies (ICT) sector. Hence a developing information economy implies an 
increasing importance of ICT activities. A good example of this definition is provided 
by Stiglitz (2003) in his discussion of the claimed mismanagement of the US and 
global economy in the 1990s 
The New Economy represented a change of equally momentous proportions 
[as the Industrial Revolution]: a shift from the production of goods to the 
production of ideas, entailing the processing of information, not of people or 
inventories. (pp4-5) 
 
In terms of the possible effects of a narrowly conceived information economy on the 
recent evolution of giant firms, this definition somewhat simplifies the analysis. 
Attention can be focused on the relative size (dis)advantages of ICT firms, compared 
to non-ICT firms, and the way in which this is mapped into changes in aggregate 
concentration by the relative growth of the ICT sector. But while this narrow 
definition is useful, in that it focuses attention on the technological drivers behind 
current economic and organisational changes, it has a shortcoming in that the 
economic influence of ICT activities is not restricted to the ICT sector. 
 A broad definition of the information economy recognises the input-output, or 
supply chain, linkages between ICT and other activities. It therefore views the new 
economy as ICT activities plus other activities the functioning of which have been 
restructured as a result of ICT inputs. Note here that, with this broad definition, ICT 
outputs affect the input side of non-ICT activities. This impact of ICT outputs is 
driven by price reductions and quality improvements of the outputs concerned and 
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hence an increasing shift towards productivity improvements being ICT driven.1 The 
neo-Schumpeterian analysis of technological and institutional restructuring appears to 
be consistent with this broad definition of the new economy. Freeman and Perez 
(1988) view a techno-economic paradigm (in our context a new economy) not simply 
as being based on new products and productive systems (i.e. a narrow new economy) 
but more importantly key inputs dominating change. This domination of change 
operates by new activities: facilitating cost reductions; being characterised by elastic 
long-run supply conditions; and having the potential for use with existing activities. 
 In terms of the current discussion, this broad definition presents a taxonomic 
complexity in that ‘old’ and ‘new’ activities are not separable. Furthermore, ‘old’ 
activities may be considered functionally part of the new information-based economy 
if ICT inputs are dominating developments. Hence some ‘old economy’ giant firms 
may be part of the ‘new economy’. This complexity is further compounded with a 
systemic definition of the information economy. We can understand the difference 
between this latter view and a broad definition in terms of the way in which outputs 
are conceptualised. Following standard reasoning outputs determine the definitions of 
markets and inputs the definitions of industries. With a broad definition of the 
information economy emphasis is placed on the way in which ICT activities 
restructure non-ICT industries. With a systemic definition, non-ICT markets as well 
industries are restructured. With a broad definition, outputs are necessarily defined in 
objective and technical terms. With a systemic definition, outputs can be viewed as a 
bundle of characteristics that include, in addition to objective and technical aspects of 
a good or service, factors such as the way in which information about an output is 
                                                 
1  See Jorgensen (2001) for evidence that US based ICT activities have experienced significant real 
price reductions and quality improvements that have resulted in a reorientation of the sources of 
productivity growth. 
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acquired or the manner in which a product is purchased. It follows that ICT activities 
can affect the outputs of non-ICT firms, a perspective argued by, for example 
Leadbetter (1999) as considered below. For instance, the development of internet 
banking need not have changed the technical aspects of bank account use but has 
clearly changed the bundle of characteristics that can be purchased. An implication 
here is that the growth potential of non-ICT firms can be significantly influenced by a 
developing information economy. In terms of a discussion of the evolution of giant 
firms, it follows that even though ICT firms may have different firm size advantages 
compared to non-ICT firms  (but this is somewhat debatable for reasons set out 
below) the position of giant firms in the new economy is more complex. One 
implication is that new giant firms need not exhibit fundamentally different 
characteristics compared to those they replace.  
 
2. The development of giant firms: a simple framework 
This section will present a simple a framework that can be used to develop 
preliminary ideas about the impact of the information economy on giant firms. As 
background, and to facilitate presentation of the framework, the discussion will 
initially consider the development of giant firms in the ‘old economy’. In this context 
‘old economy’ firms are those with products in the mature stages of their life cycles. 
Following Simon (1991) and Galbraith (1974) we can suggest that the central 
characteristic involved in the development of giant firms is the increasingly organised 
or bureaucratised nature of firm activity. This observation, in turn, suggests that in 
developing a framework that can be used to understand the evolution or restructuring 
of giant firms, emphasis should be placed on the costs of organisation or 
bureaucratisation. Related to this emphasis on the centrality of organisation to 
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understanding giant firms is the distinction drawn by Kornai (1971), and more 
recently Casson (1997), that any economic activity involves real and control aspects. 
Following this logic we decompose a firm’s costs into two elements: production, or 
real, costs that are attributable to specific outputs and non-attributable overhead 
organisation, or control, costs. Without loss of generality we can assume that, for an 
old economy firm, average production costs (APC) are constant. As organisation costs 
are an overhead it follows that average organisation costs (AOC) decline as firm 
output increases. A firm’s average total costs (AC) are therefore APC + AOC.2 
 We view the evolution of giant firms as a process involving increasing 
organisation costs and declining average production costs. Obviously for any single 
firm this process is likely to be characterised by intermittent periods of major 
restructuring followed by incremental development. But we can abstract from this 
detail by projecting the historical process into a single decision: a firm can choose 
between high and low organisation costs and the accompanying low and high average 
production costs. To invoke a specific example we can cite the shift from functional 
to multidivisional organisation initiated in the USA in the early part of the 20th 
century with later diffusion in Europe (Chandler 1962, 1977). Referring to figure 1, 
initially firms have a management structure that defines AOC1 and production costs 
APC1, with resulting average costs being AC1. This initial position is indicated by 
dashed curves. Managerial-organisational development allows more efficient 
production with the result that production costs fall to APC2, but the management 
development implies increased organisational overheads resulting in the shift AOC1 to 
AOC2. It is important to recognise that this latter shift is not parallel but implies a 
                                                 
2  To avoid ambiguity it can be noted that the costs referred to in the text are short-run not long-run. 
Short-run costs are the actual expenses incurred by a firm. In terms of the conceptualisation 
presented here, these short-run costs are based on a fixed organisational or control input into firm 
activity. Long-run costs are plans rather than actual outcomes. 
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steeper AOC curve. Following the managerial development average costs therefore 
pivot from AC1 to AC2. If the firm’s planned output is, for example, Q* it follows that 
the organisational development is rational as AC2 is lower than AC1 at this output. 
But if output is less than Q1 the original management structure is more efficient as 
AC1 is lower than AC2.  
 
Figure 1 here, see end. 
 
 This general framework is consistent with more specific perspectives on the 
firm. For instance, Chandler (1977) argues that modern firms gained their advantage 
from the organisational infrastructure involved allowing an effective exploitation of 
production based scale economies. Without a developed organisational infrastructure 
a firm cannot guarantee a position on its long-run average cost curve. In terms of 
figure 1 the organisational infrastructure results in the shift AOC1 to AOC2 but has the 
advantage of consistently lower production costs. In a more explicitly empirical 
tradition, figure 1 is also consistent with the work of Prais (1976) and Hannah (1983). 
Both writers emphasise the importance of non-production based factors in the 
development of giant firms in the UK, most notably marketing, finance and R&D 
management benefits. But such advantages imply a requirement for more 
sophisticated organisational structures and processes. 
 Finally we can connect figure 1 to Williamson’s (1975, 1985) transaction cost 
account of firm development. Key elements of this argument are that (a) an 
organisational hierarchy is necessary to control agent opportunism and (b) that the 
multidivisional organisation allows a more efficient allocation of resources within a 
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firm. In short, the development of the firm as an organisational entity allows more 
efficient production by controlling opportunism and allowing more rational 
management.  
A complication apparently not recognised by transaction cost writers is that 
transaction cost advantages are contingent on predictability of output.  This is clear 
from figure 1. On a vertical line defined by Q*, the shift AC1 to AC2 results in an 
overall efficiency gain. But if Q* cannot be guaranteed the efficiency gains cannot be 
guaranteed. In short, transaction cost theory is necessarily an equilibrium approach to 
organisations (Dietrich, 1994) as it appears to assume that plans and outcomes are the 
same for real output decisions. To some extent the necessary market predictability 
may follow from the restructuring of a firm’s average costs. The shift AC1 to AC2 
results in a steeper curve implying increased barriers to market entry for potential 
competitors. These increased barriers will themselves generate greater predictability. 
These observations are consistent with views that the modern corporation (Galbraith, 
1974) or big business (Aaronovitch & Sawyer, 1975) requires predictability for 
effective functioning. The implication here is that effective transaction cost 
economising behaviour, at least as applied to the development of giant firms, requires 
a necessary degree of market power. That this market power might involve higher 
prices is to some extent secondary to the requirement of predictability. More 
generally, we cannot claim that market power and efficiency are two alternative, and 
mutually exclusive, accounts of firm development. Hence the perspective offered here 
distances itself from Williamson’s (1981: 1566) argument that 
The view that the corporation is first and foremost an efficiency instrument 
does not deny that firms also seek to monopolize markets… But specific 
structural preconditions need to be satisfied if strategic behaviour is to be 
feasible – and most firms do not qualify, which is to say that strategic 
behaviour is the exception rather than the rule. 
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In particular it is being suggested here that the efficiency seeking basis of the modern 
corporation introduces the structural imperfections necessary for strategic behaviour 
i.e. greater organisational barriers to entry develop because of a steeper AC curve. In 
addition, these imperfections are not viewed as a separate approach to understanding 
the modern corporation but a necessary aspect of efficiency seeking behaviour 
because of a required predictability. 
But it is also clear from figure 1 that this predictability implies reduced 
flexibility because of the steeper average total costs involved, and hence the local 
rather than global relevance of the more developed control systems involved with 
giant corporation. In addition, if this predictability is undermined the rationale for the 
traditional modern corporation may be, not is, similarly undermined. A key aspect of 
the recent history of market economies, emphasised by writers from different 
traditions, is increasing economic uncertainty. Of direct relevance to the current paper 
is that the development and use of information technology will itself engender greater 
market uncertainty, a key point argued by economists Shapiro and Varian (1999).  
A not inconsistent perspective to that argued by Shapiro and Varian is 
suggested by Leadbetter (1999). He stresses the implications of a developing 
‘knowledge economy’ with its particular organisational and institutional 
requirements. In his own words, the ‘knowledge-driven economy is not made up by a 
set of knowledge-intensive industries fed by science. This new economy is driven by 
new factors of production and sources of competitive advantage - innovation, design, 
branding, know-how - which are at work in all industries...’ (p10). In terms of the 
evolution of (giant) firms, he claims that currently giant corporations are having ‘a 
new lease of life’ (p60) because of their ability to survive the volatility of the 
emerging knowledge economy. But, eventually, it is claimed new flexible small-
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medium organisations will become dominant based on networks of corporate 
relationships. This latter prediction is examined below. 
A related perspective on current restructuring, to that suggested by Leadbetter, 
is the academic tradition known as flexible specialisation theory. Building on the 
seminal work of Piore and Sabel (1984), the explanation here views restructuring as a 
response to demand led effects (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1989). Mass production systems, 
with characteristic rigid hierarchies, have faced problems since the 1970s from 
external shocks that have made demand more uncertain. Furthermore, traditional 
consumer durable markets are becoming increasingly saturated and demand becoming 
increasingly fragmented, undermining the standardisation necessary to exploit scale 
economies. It is argued that these changes provide an increasing comparative 
advantage for networks of small firms (Marshallian industrial districts: Best, 1990; 
Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992). Note here that (1) there is no prediction about a short-
run comparative advantage of giant firms and (2) economic uncertainty is not simply 
grounded in the information economy. 
More generally Kumar (1985) and Dunne and Hughes (1994) have found 
smaller firms growing faster than larger firms. This represents an important shift from 
the significant growth advantages of size identified earlier by, for example, Prais 
(1976). These more recent findings are consistent with the more general ‘small firms’ 
literature that suggests an increasing importance of small scale production since the 
1970s (Carlsson, 1989; Acs and Audretsch, 1987; Sengenberger et al, 1990). In terms 
of the implications for the current discussion, if we assume that these effects are 
decreasing but monotonic in firm size, an increasing importance of small scale 
activity suggests an increasing comparative disadvantage of large, and successively 
giant, firms. 
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It is clear, therefore, that a not uncommon theme in recent writing is the 
creation of a link between the increasing uncertainty of the modern economy and an 
increasing disadvantage of the inflexibility of the traditional corporation. The basis of 
such a link is clear from figure 1. But the suggestion that developing uncertainty will 
undermine giant firms in the long-run depends on a particular reading of how giant 
firms respond to the new environment. Using figure 1, we can suggest that a 
developing information economy might impact on the functioning and significance of 
giant firms in the following ways: 
1. Reduced production costs. 
2. Neoclassical organisational restructuring. 
3. Evolutionary organisational restructuring. 
4. Restructured production costs. 
These will be considered in turn. 
 
Reduced production costs 
If we follow the argument of, for example Freeman and Perez (1988) as discussed 
above, information technology is a key input that is dominating current restructuring 
i.e. the information economy has the ability to provide generalised efficiency savings 
for firms in many industries. If these technologies reduce production, rather than 
organisation, costs we can see the possible impacts from figure 1. Production based 
efficiency savings will shift down APC1 and APC2, resulting in parallel shifts down in 
AC1 and AC2. Assuming that the shifts in APC1 and APC2 are of the same order, the 
implication is that the significance of the forms of organisation underlying AOC1 and 
AOC2 remain unchanged. In addition the significance of organisational barriers to 
entry and organisational inflexibilities are unchanged. In short, the use of information 
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technologies to improve production based efficiency appears not to undermine the 
significance of giant firms because of unchanged entry barriers, equally the flexibility 
disadvantages of giant firms, in uncertain conditions, still exist. 
 
Neoclassical organisational restructuring 
To understand the possible implications of a developing information economy on 
organisational restructuring, and hence on average organisation costs in figure 1, we 
can draw a distinction between neoclassical and evolutionary approaches to 
information. A neoclassical approach to information is clearly defined by Shapiro and 
Varian (1999: 8-9) 
In short, today’s breathless pace of change and the current fascination with the 
information economy are driven by advances in information technology and 
infrastructure, not by any fundamental shift in the nature or even the 
magnitude of the information itself… What’s new is our ability to manipulate 
information, not the total amount of information available. [emphasis added] 
 
The final sentence of the above quotation emphasises the key distinction between 
neoclassical and evolutionary information. With neoclassical information, the 
information economy improves the ability to manipulate information not the total 
available. In an evolutionary world, the information available is not specifiable ex-
ante, but rather reveals itself as an aspect of evolutionary processes (Hodgson, 1993). 
From an evolutionary perspective a developing information economy can impact on 
learning processes and hence impact on the discovery of new information. The 
possible implications here will be explored below. In terms of the definitions of an 
information economy presented above, a neoclassical perspective is based on a broad 
definition and an evolutionary perspective a systemic definition. 
 From a neo-classical perspective a greater ability to manipulate information 
will reduce control costs. Within the firm, managerial efficiency gains might result 
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from flatter organisational structures involving, for instance, elimination of 
organisation layers and centralisation of information management. In addition, 
subcontracting can be seen as a natural response to a developing information 
economy. For example Milgrom and Roberts (1990) suggest that flexible technology 
is reducing asset specificity and hence leading to vertical disintegration because of 
transaction cost factors. Any reduction in organisation costs will impact on AOC2, in 
figure 1, in two ways: the curve will shift down and it will become flatter. The 
resulting shift in the average cost curve, and in particular because it is flatter away 
from Q*, implies a reduction in organisational barriers to entry. In addition AC1 and 
AC2 will cross at a lower output level, i.e. Q1 will fall, implying that the bureaucratic 
requirements of giant size will be less compromised by environmental uncertainty i.e. 
there will be an increase in organisational flexibility. 
 In terms of developing specific predictions about the evolution of giant firms 
that might result from neoclassical organisational restructuring we can suggest the 
following. Restructuring will have a negative impact on the size of giant firms when 
size is measured by employment; hence employment concentration might be expected 
to decline. But the resulting changes in organisational flexibility and organisational 
entry barriers have an uncertain impact on giant firms as value generating units and 
hence sales concentration. On the one hand improved organisational flexibility 
implies a greater ability to respond to environmental uncertainty and hence improved 
performance; the logical prediction here is an increase in sales concentration. On the 
other hand a reduction in organisational barriers to market entry implies greater 
potential competition with a logical prediction being a reduction in sales 
concentration. The first possibility implies giant firm dominated restructuring, the 
second an undermining of giant companies. 
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 Evolutionary organisational restructuring 
An evolutionary perspective on information has potentially different organisational 
implications compared to those just discussed. The key issue here is that radical 
uncertainty exists in the Knightian (1921) or Austrian senses. Furthermore, using a 
characteristic Austrian method, we cannot assume a pre-given amount of information 
but rather information is only discovered and revealed following the decisions of 
economic agents (Hayek, 1945). But, in an organisational setting, rather than a setting 
of atomistic individuals with subjective knowledge, it is inappropriate to assume that 
firm observation of the decisions of other agents and outcomes of these decisions is a 
straightforward activity. Instead the organisational discovery process must recognise 
the costs of, and barriers to, firm learning. From this perspective, information can 
become more uncertain if the information economy influences the ability to 
manipulate information. With unchanged firm learning capacity, a greater density of 
decisions by other agents will increase uncertainty for the firm concerned, assuming 
the other decisions are different.  
 One way of conceptualising evolutionary organisational restructuring is to 
follow Langlois and Robertson (1995) and Foss (1993) and suggest that the firm can 
be conceived as a bundle of resources or competencies that can be coordinated in 
different, and idiosyncratic ways. Organisational change can then be thought of as a 
re-coordination of resources with managerial costs, or dynamic transaction costs, 
being necessary. It follows that tracking, responding to and exploiting a more 
uncertain environment requires greater dynamic transaction costs.  
This recognition of the management costs of organisational evolution can be traced 
back to two sources. Penrose (1980) emphasised the link between managerial excess 
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capacity and firm growth. As with all excess capacity there is an (implicit) 
opportunity cost. The second tradition is behavioural economics and the claim that 
firm adjustment to a changed environment requires organisational slack (March and 
Simon, 1958).3 But in terms of giant firms two factors are likely to inhibit dynamic 
capability. First the rigidities of efficiency seeking managerial control in a 
hierarchical setting will reduce the possibility of organisational excess capacity. 
Secondly, even if such excess capacity is allowed to develop, or exists despite 
managerial control, returns to individual creative efforts are the legal entitlement of 
the firm rather than the individual(s) concerned. 
 Given these comments we can suggest that a dynamic response to 
environmental uncertainty and change will involve, in terms of figure 1, increased 
organisation costs. In addition because of the rigidities of giant firms cited in the 
previous paragraph, we can assume that this increase is non-trivial. The potential 
implications follow from a steeper average cost curve than would exist without the 
dynamic transaction costs. Assuming the investment in dynamic capability is 
successful in generating greater output, increased organisational barriers to entry will 
exist. This greater market power will produce the predictability necessary for 
improved firm performance. Without this predictability the steeper average cost curve 
that follows from investment in dynamic capability implies increased organisational 
rigidities that in an uncertain environment undermines effective performance. 
 It follows that investment in dynamic capability, for giant firms, involves 
managing a trade-off between (1) market power and (2) organisational rigidities. With 
risk averse management this may result in a tendency not to invest in dynamic 
                                                 
3  For UK giant firms there does appear to be a relationship between the existence of organisational 
slack and excellent firm performance (see Dietrich, 2003) that is consistent with investment in 
dynamic capability. 
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capability unless the returns involved are relatively certain or large i.e. if anticipated 
monopoly power is certain. For this reason we can characterise evolutionary 
organisational restructuring for giant firms as an essentially defensive development. 
An implication here is that more risky investments, that require individual 
entrepreneurial capability within larger firms, will be avoided and so can lead to the 
creation of small spin-off firms, as appears to have happened in Silicon Valley USA 
(Leadbetter, 1999).  
 In terms of specific predictions about the evolution of giant firms, and in 
particular input and output concentration changes, we can suggest the following. For 
aggregate employment concentration we cannot predict a necessary reduction (as with 
neoclassical information) because of the investment in dynamic transaction costs. If 
firm strategies are dominated by investment in dynamic capability, the change in 
employment concentration will depend on the extent to which this investment is 
distributed across giant and non-giant firms. If entrepreneurial investment is 
concentrated at the top end of the firm size distribution we can expect an increase in 
aggregate employment concentration. But for reasons discussed above any such 
increase is likely to be defensive in terms of giant firm strategy. If the investment in 
dynamic transaction costs is successful an increase in sales concentration can be 
expected. But if unsuccessful, particularly in the context of global competition, 
declining sales concentration can result because of the organisational rigidities 
involved.  
This possibility of a failed defensive strategy is consistent with the Leadbetter 
(1999) view mentioned above that giant firms might have a short-run advantage but 
long-run disadvantage in the emerging new economy. But, in addition it may suggest 
a possible longer-run complementarity between giant and smaller firms in which the 
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former have advantages, involving for instance marketing and developmental R&D 
that involve investment in sunk assets, that complement smaller firm adaptability. 
This complementarity is different to that identified above with neoclassical 
information as with the current case the dominance of giant firms is somewhat 
qualified by (constrained) competition from smaller companies. 
 
Restructured production costs 
We can now turn to the final way in which a developing information economy might 
impact on giant firms. The previous three sub-sections have examined how ‘old 
economy’ firms might respond to the new environment, but there is in addition new, 
information based, firms. Such firms have the characteristic that they have not yet 
achieved the mature stages of their product life cycles. Following Shapiro and Varian 
(1999) we can suggest that the central characteristic of an ‘information firm’ is that 
fixed production costs are significant but marginal costs are minimal. The result is a 
continuously falling APC curve. In addition significant scope and scale economies are 
commonly available to information firms.  
 
Figure 2 here, see end. 
 
Initially discussion can be based on figure 2 that compares a ‘small’ (subscript 
S) firm with a ‘large’ (subscript L) firm. For illustrative convenience the small firm 
situation is shown with dashed curves. Economies of scale and scope shift the average 
production cost curve from APCS to APCL resulting in lower unit production costs for 
a large firm with output QL compared to a small firm with output QS. With small firm 
average management costs of AOCS a small firm has average total costs of ACS. With 
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unchanged average organisation costs, the economies of scale and scope will shift the 
average total cost curve from ACS to AC’. With the managerial overhead required by 
a large firm the actual ACL curve will be above AC’ and steeper. Possible ACS and 
ACL curves are shown in figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 here, see end. 
 
 The following comments, based on figure 3, would seem to be pertinent. For 
products and technologies not in the mature stages of their life cycles, arguably a 
reasonable depiction of the information economy, the relevant comparison in figure 3 
might be between QS and Q’ not QS and QL. It follows that early in life cycles small 
firms may be able to compete, on an equal cost based footing, with larger firms. But 
this need not be a general conclusion. It is clear that the general shapes of the average 
cost curves in figure 3 are the same as in figure 1. It follows that as the new 
information technologies mature the same cost based dynamics are likely to be 
involved. So, with output potential being QL large firms will have an absolute cost 
advantage over smaller competitors. In short, we might not expect significant long-
run differences with regard to the significance of giant firms. Small firms will be 
restricted to niche activity. More generally the simple framework used here suggests 
that predictions about a developing comparative disadvantage of giant firms, example 
opinions of which were given above, may be a short-run rather than long-run 
phenomenon. 
 While there is this fundamental similarity between figures 1 and 3 there are 
important differences. First, because of the short-run and long-run cost structures of 
an information firm it is clear from figure 3 that the slope of ACL at QL need not be 
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locally steeper than the slope of ACS at QS; in fact the opposite may be the case. It 
follows that there appears to be no necessary cost-based relative inflexibility 
associated with larger sized information based firms. This is clearly different 
compared to old economy firms, and in addition reinforces the conclusion just drawn 
that any comparative disadvantage of giant size may be a short-run rather than long-
run phenomenon.  
 A second difference between figures 1 and 3 follows from the underlying cost 
structure of an information firm. The AC curve may be steeper for significant, rather 
than local, shifts away from expected output compared to an old economy firm. This 
is the case for three reasons. First there is the already cited characteristic of significant 
fixed production costs but minimal marginal costs. Second, because of the non-mature 
nature of the technologies and products firms will invest in dynamic capabilities as a 
core aspect of competitive strategy rather than as a more temporary aspect of 
organisational turnaround. This increases organisational overheads compared to old 
economy firms. Finally, we must recognise the importance of lock-in and switching 
costs. Lock-in exists with ‘old economy’ firms, and is the basis of a transaction cost 
analysis of the firm (Williamson, 1985). But with information based firms lock-in is 
pervasive (Shapiro and Varian, 1999) because of the complementarity of durable 
assets. The implication here is that a new information based firm, attempting to enter 
an established market, must absorb the switching costs of customers from established 
producers. These switching costs will consequently increase a new firm’s overhead 
costs with the result that significant first mover advantages can exist. The result of 
these cost effects is that we need not expect flexible information based giant firms to 
be necessarily associated with contestable markets. In short the information based 
economy can be just as giant firm based as the old economy.  
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There is one important qualification that must be made to this conclusion. 
Because of the non-mature nature of the technologies involved, new firm entry may 
be facilitated by the production of fundamentally new products. In addition, if 
investment in giant firm dynamic capabilities is governed by risk averse management, 
this type of new firm entry is more likely.4
 
3. Giant Firms in the UK, EU and USA 
This section will put preliminary empirical flesh on the discussion undertaken in the 
previous section. The significance of giant firms is measured using aggregate 
concentration ratios, and in particular the 100 firm ratio. The use of 100 firms as the 
measurement threshold, is somewhat traditional and dates back to, for example, the 
work of Prais (1976). The firm data used here covers the 100 largest companies in the 
UK, USA and (non UK) Europe. Two measures of size are used: sales and 
employment. Obviously, the top 100 measured by sales is not identical to that 
measured by employment. In all cases the final year for the data is 1997, but the initial 
year changes because of data availability. For the UK the first data point is 1979 and 
for the USA 1980.  For European companies data on company turnover is available 
for 1980 but for employment the first data point is 1990. In addition because of 
information availability problems two European data sets are provided covering seven 
and twelve countries, as detailed in the notes to tables 1c and 1d. As a rule of thumb 
the EU7 concentration ratios may be more accurate as they involve fewer data 
                                                 
4  It might be argued that the above analysis of information based giant firms is overly cost oriented 
and consequently ignores important demand effects. One such demand effect concerns network 
economies that are likely to be pervasive in information based industries (Arthur, 1989; Varian and 
Shapiro, 1999). The result is a tendency towards standardisation and lock-in of technologies. But 
this standardisation is consistent with many or few firms depending on supply-side cost 
characteristics. Hence ignoring this demand effect would not seem to compromise the analysis in 
the text of the (potential) significance of giant firms in information industries. 
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imputations. More detailed discussion on sources and data set development can be 
found in appendix one. 
 If we follow the commonly accepted Clarke and Davies (1983) framework, 
any change in aggregate concentration can be decomposed into market diversification 
and market concentration effects. This perspective suggests a potentially useful way 
to map aggregate concentration developments into changes in the significance of giant 
firms. But for current purposes the Clarke and Davies framework has two limitations. 
First, it is based on an aggregate Herfindahl index. It need not follow that the same 
decomposition applies to an aggregate concentration ratio. Secondly, the Clarke and 
Davies framework assesses aggregate concentration based on production within a 
national economy. But it is clear that multinational companies have sales and 
employment allocated across different economies. It follows that with significant 
globalising trends, using data based on production within an economy, rather than 
company based data, drives a wedge between aggregate concentration and the 
significance of giant firms.  
For these two reasons an alternative decomposition of aggregate concentration 
is presented in appendix two. The decomposition uses a logic similar to that used by 
Clarke and Davies except that aggregate concentration is measured by a concentration 
ratio, and firms are viewed in terms of their total size rather than size within a 
particular economy. Using this approach a 100 firm aggregate concentration ratio is 
shown to be determined by four factors: (1) market power for primary activities in the 
home market of the 100 largest firms; (2) the global presence for primary activities of 
the 100 largest firms; (3) weighted product diversification; and (4) the economic 
structure of the home economy. These four determinants of aggregate concentration 
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facilitate an interpretation of changes in concentration ratios in terms of the activities 
of giant firms. 
 Using this decomposition to asses the changing significance of giant 
companies requires data based on total firm size, with each firm allocated to the 
country that houses the company headquarters. It is clear that for this population of 
firms, size is not the same as size within a particular economy or particular market. 
The intention is to use respectively sales and employment aggregate concentration 
ratios as indicators of output and input developments. That output and input 
developments might diverge is indicated by discussion in the previous section.  
We can recognise that employment concentration is obviously an imperfect indicator 
of firm size because of differing labour intensities. But in the absence of an adequate 
measure of firm capital there is little that can be done about this problem. A related 
point is that the current study uses total revenue not value-added as an output based 
measure of size. White (2002) argues that total revenue is an inappropriate size 
indicator because of double counting. In terms of the construction of concentration 
ratios, double counting is only a problem if GNP or GDP is used as the denominator 
of the ratios. The turnover concentration ratios reported here are not based on GNP or 
GDP, instead total gross output is used, as derived from input-output tables. In 
addition this double counting issue is only significant if we wish to evaluate the 
contribution of firms to a particular market or economy. This is not the case with 
aggregate concentration in which we are measuring the significance of firm size not 
simply economic net contribution. 
 The discussion in this section is essentially preliminary, or introductory, as it 
assumes that there is a given population of giant (and non-giant) firms. Any changes 
in aggregate concentration therefore result from zero-sum changes in domestic and 
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international competition. In terms of the decomposition presented in appendix one, 
the industrial composition of an economy is unchanged. Hence changes in aggregate 
concentration can be directly linked to giant firm activity and explained in terms of 
changes in monopoly power, global presence and diversification. Later discussion 
allows for changes in the population of giant firms. The current discussion is 
undertaken to simplify the development of linkages between discussion in the 
previous section and changes in aggregate concentration.  
 
Figure 4 here, see end. 
 
 Possible linkages between earlier and current discussion can be presented in 
terms of the simple framework suggested in figure 4. In a rather stylised manner we 
can distinguish between output and input concentration increases and decreases. Cell 
1 suggests a continuation of characteristic ‘old economy’ trends. Giant firm 
development would be characterised by increasing seller concentration and/or global 
presence and/or diversification. This possibility would imply a subordinate role for 
smaller firms. Of course this would not preclude the local relevance of smaller firms 
in particular industries or regions. Evidence consistent with cell 2 would indicate the 
general relevance of small/medium firm networking and decline of giant firms. Cell 3 
defines a situation of reduced input concentration, involving for example reduced 
vertical integration or more generally diversification, but not reduced market power or 
global presence because of increased output concentration. We can, therefore, 
characterise cell 3 as giant firm dominated networks, involving the importance of 
subcontracting etc., along with no real competitive challenge from smaller firms. Cell 
4 involves increased input concentration and reduced output concentration. In terms 
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of earlier discussion this defines a defensive strategy with giant firms investing in 
dynamic capabilities that can result in increased diversification and/or global 
presence. But the reduction in output concentration implies that such investment 
might have either (a) little long-run viability because of domestic and/or international 
competition or (b) have a complementary relationship with smaller firms. The former 
possibility suggests a transitional arrangement between cells 1 and 2 whereas the 
latter is potentially stable but suggests a downgrading of the importance of giant 
firms.  
 
Tables 1a-1d here, see end. 
 
Tables 1a-1d report 20, 50 and 100 firm aggregate concentration ratios for the 
UK, USA and Europe. The US ratios are consistent with data reported in White 
(2002). Using consolidated company data, i.e. the same as that used here, the latter 
study reports that the employment share of the largest 500 companies declined from 
21.2 per cent to 15.4 per cent over the period 1980-97. This reduction for 500 firms is 
consistent with the change from 11.9 to 8.6 reported in table 1b. The relative sizes of 
the 500:100 firm shares for 1980 and 1997 are constant at 1.8. For Europe the results 
in tables 1c and 1d are not inconsistent with results presented by de Jong (1993). He 
shows that the contribution of the largest 100 European industrial firms to GDP 
declined by approximately 10 percentage points over the period 1982 to 1990. This 
result is consistent with the smaller changes of 3.6 and 3.9 points shown in tables 1c 
and 1d as the denominators of the EU sales concentration ratios used here are clearly 
larger than GDP; in addition the wider coverage of firms used here, that includes the 
financial sector, may be significant. 
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In terms of the ranking of concentration levels, the UK is highest, followed by 
the USA with Europe being lowest for both turnover and employment. The relative 
concentration levels in the UK and USA reflect a continuation of the position in the 
1970s, as provided by the Prais (1976) and White (1981) studies that use value-added 
in manufacturing, and the more recent evidence in Hughes and Kumar (1984); 
although the inclusion of financial companies here, and their absence in the earlier 
studies, may be significant. The low level of aggregate concentration for EU countries 
is consistent with the low concentration in West Germany in the 1970s as discussed in 
Davies and Lyons (1996). In addition, the decline in concentration, when tables 1c 
and 1d are compared, indicates the relatively lower aggregate concentration in 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden, compared to the EU7 countries 
of Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal. 
 
Figure 5 here, see end. 
 
 Using the framework set out in figure 4, figure 5 uses the 100 firm results 
reported in table 1a-1d and shows that the experiences in the UK, USA and EU are 
different apart from the important fact that there is no continuation of old economy 
dominance. Hence only at a very basic level, i.e. movement away from cell 1, are the 
results reported here consistent with a ‘new economy’ thesis because these initial 
conclusions suggest that there is no single evolutionary trajectory. One possible 
explanation for these differences might be that giant firms in the UK, EU and USA 
are different simply because they are different sizes. For instance US giant firms may 
be ‘more giant’ than those in the UK and hence the two data sets may not be 
comparable. This possibility is explored in tables 2a–2b.  
 -26-
 Tables 2a and 2b here, see end. 
 
 It can be seen in table 2a that, in terms of average employment, the top 100 is 
smallest in the UK and approximately the same size in the EU and USA. Hence the 
different changes in aggregate employment concentration in the USA and EU cannot 
be explained simply in terms of different firm sizes. In addition the similar changes in 
aggregate employment concentration in the UK and USA seems unaffected by the 
different firm sizes. The important similarity for these two countries, identified in 
table 2a, involves reductions in giant firm employment, whereas for EU firms there 
has been increased employment. With size measured by sales, shown in table 2b, the 
UK has, once again the smallest giant firms. In addition, when the UK and USA are 
compared the average size difference seems to have widened. It is also apparent from 
this table that at the start of the period US giant firms were clearly the largest whereas 
by 1997 the gap between the US and EU average had largely closed. In short, it seems 
that we cannot account for the differences identified in figure 5 simply in terms of 
size differences. Hence any explanation must lie elsewhere. 
 
4. Giant Firm Mobility 
Obviously the populations of giant firms in the UK, EU and USA are not static. With 
a narrow definition of the ‘new economy’ we might expect an introduction of ICT-
based companies. If a broad or systemic definition is appropriate new technologies 
might also support the development of new giant firms in non-ICT activities, for 
instance in the finance sector. In terms of our general decomposition of aggregate 
concentration provided in appendix two, the development of an information economy 
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will affect the industrial structure. Hence even with constant market concentration 
levels, global presence and diversification, aggregate concentration can change. To 
analyse the possible impacts here we will initially examine the overall importance of 
giant firm mobility, which is indicated in table 3.  
 
Table 3 here, see end 
 
The US data in table 3 can be compared with that provided by Collins and 
Preston (1961) and Scherer and Ross (1990) who report exits from the top 100 
industrial and distribution firms. The average exit rate for 1909-19 is 4 per year. This 
declines to 1.5 per year for 1935-48, and increases to 3.0 per year for 1977-87. The 
data reported here is not inconsistent with a further rise for 1980-97, but the different 
coverage may be significant involving, in particular the development of giant 
financial sector firms, as detailed below. Comparing the UK and USA, it can be seen 
that the UK has significantly lower degrees of mobility for both size measures. If 
giant firm births are small compared to deaths then, ceteris paribus,5 we might expect 
lower domestic market shares and/or globalisation and/or diversification. In these 
circumstances it follows that greater giant firm mobility will reduce aggregate 
concentration (or increase it less). This may be part of a general explanation of why 
the UK has experienced an increase in aggregate sales concentration but the USA a 
reduction. 
 With respect to European companies table 3 indicates that mobility is higher 
for EU12 compared to EU7, signifying greater giant firm mobility for the additional 
                                                 
5  The ceteris paribus assumption here may not be inappropriate. As will be discussed below the 
USA and UK appear to have similar giant firm populations. 
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five economies. For firm size measured by revenue, EU7 giant firms have mobility 
rates approximately the same as for the UK. This similar mobility appears to be 
associated, in tables 1a-1d, with very different changes in aggregate sales 
concentration: the UK has a rise and EU7 a fall in aggregate sales concentration. If we 
use the framework presented in appendix 2, the rise in the UK must be based on 
increased market power and/or global presence and/or diversification and/or the 
growth of activities with these characteristics. Given the reduction in employment 
concentration it is reasonable to place emphasis on the significance of market power 
in the UK. For EU7 firms there must have been reduced market power and/or global 
presence and/or diversification and/or the growth of activities with these 
characteristics. Part of the complexity here might be the different markets that giant 
firms are involved in. This is a matter considered in detail below. For the moment we 
can note that the market bases of EU giant firms are somewhat different from those in 
the UK and USA.  
 When interpreting the employment figures in table 3 the shorter time period 
over which the data is measured may be significant. To some extent the per annum 
figures may be a more useful indicator of employment mobility for Europe. But at the 
same time we cannot discount the possibility of greater firm births/deaths in the latter 
part of the 1980-97 period hence biasing upwards the per annum employment, 
compared to turnover, figures that are based on 1990-97.  
The European data indicate an important point concerning the difficulty of 
drawing general conclusions about the effects of giant firm births/deaths. Per annum 
mobility measured by employment in Europe is higher than in both the UK and the 
USA. This has been associated with an increase in EU aggregate employment 
concentration (see tables 1c and 1d), with an explanation in terms of market power, 
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globalisation etc being possible. But with size measured by turnover a reduction 
occurred, implying lower market power etc. This difference is explicable using the 
data in table 4. 
 
Table 4 here, see end. 
 
With respect to turnover growth rates European giant companies seem to 
exhibit the same pattern as in the USA in that average firm growth is less than the 
growth rate of the economy. The UK is the exception here, perhaps reflecting the 
strong positive impact on turnover growth rates of increasing inequality within the 
giant firm population combined with relatively slow total gross output growth. But for 
employment growth rates there is a clear difference between, on the one hand, the UK 
and USA, and Europe on the other. For the UK and USA, average giant firm 
employment growth is negative whereas total employment growth is positive, 
particularly in the USA. But for European companies, positive giant firm employment 
growth coincides with negative total employment growth. These differences can 
explain the connections between firm mobility and aggregate concentration changes. 
The negative overall growth in total EU employment will affect the denominator of 
the employment concentration ratios in a manner opposite to the considerable growth 
in EU gross output. In addition, from appendix 2, reduced total employment will 
amplify the market power etc effects on aggregate employment concentration whereas 
considerable growth in gross output will dampen the same effects.  
 The effects of giant firm mobility on aggregate concentration can be further 
explored by recognising that any change in aggregate concentration will be caused by 
two different factors. First, continuing giant firms, i.e. those that exist throughout the 
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interval in question, might change. Secondly, new giant firms can have different 
characteristics compared to those replaced. It is obvious that these two effects need 
not exhibit the same trends. To analyse these effects we can decompose concentration 
ratios and changes in concentration into (1) the part accounted for by continuing firms 
and (2) the part accounted for by exiting and entrant firms. The results are shown in 
tables 5a-5d that report the decompositions of the 100 firm aggregate concentration 
ratios. 
 
Tables 5a-5d here, see end. 
 
For the UK (see table 5a) the increase in aggregate sales concentration is due 
to both continuing firms and replacement of firms in approximately equal amounts. 
The decline in employment concentration exhibits the same characteristic. In short, 
the developing new economy in the UK seems to be exhibiting the same 
characteristics as the changing old economy. For the USA (see table 5b), the output 
and input concentration ratio declines appears to be mainly because of continuing 
giant firms rather than replacement of giant firms. This is consistent with the relative 
decline of giant firms in the old economy, but less so for the new economy. For the 
EU (tables 5c and 5d), the decline in aggregate sales concentration is due to 
continuing firms, with replacement of firms having a marginal increase. The increase 
in aggregate employment concentration is due to both sets of firms.  
 
Figure 6 here, see end. 
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This more detailed picture of the changing position of giant firms is 
summarised in figure 6, where the subscript ‘rep’ refers to replacement firms and the 
subscript ‘con’ to continuing firms. Two changes are apparent compared to figure 5. 
Perhaps the most significant concerns EU firms. Continuing firms exhibit ‘defensive’ 
strategies, but new firms are more like the ‘old economy’ compared to replacements. 
In addition we can draw attention to the fact that the input concentration is similar for 
both continuing and replacement firms. If we follow the conceptual framework set out 
earlier, this conclusion is consistent with EU giant firms investing in dynamic 
capabilities with the effect or intention of promoting market power, global presence 
and/or diversification. Furthermore, the fact that replacement firms have not exhibited 
a decrease in output concentration indicates that, at least for these companies, the 
investment was not unsuccessful. 
For US giant firms the greater detail indicated in figure 6, suggest the 
following. The relative decline is only clearly apparent for continuing firms. The same 
decline is less apparent for replacement firms. Given the evidence presented here it is 
impossible to say if this, relatively minor, difference represents the initial stages of an 
evolutionary shift towards the UK or EU positions or merely a temporary effect. 
Some speculation, in this regard, is attempted below when the analysis identifies the 
particular markets represented by replacement firms. For the moment it can be 
suggested that the greater output concentration change of replacement, compared to 
continuing, firms may be simply an indication of successful growth and hence market 
power etc. 
 
Tables 6a-6d here, see end. 
Table 7 here, see end. 
 -32-
 One final issue can now be examined: the extent to which the differences and 
similarities between continuing and replacement firms for the three data sets are due 
to the different markets and industries involved. Background data to examine this 
issue is presented in tables 6a-6d and table 7. The former tables identify exits and 
entrants, for sales and employment, by broad industry groups. The level of detail in 
tables 6a-6d somewhat masks the overall picture, hence table 7 presents summary 
statistics. So, for instance, the UK mining and petroleum –5 for the turnover number 
in table 7 is the difference between 5 exits identified in table 6a and zero entrants; the 
–17 in the % column for UK mining and petroleum is the difference, in table 6a, 
between the % total exit turnover (17) and % total entrant turnover (0) for this 
industry category. 
In table 7 the losses appear to be broadly similar across the four data sets but 
giant firm entrants are somewhat different. The UK and USA appear to be similar. For 
the UK there appears to be the idiosyncratic development of giant firms in transport, 
utilities and construction. But apart from this, in both the UK and USA new giant 
firms have appeared in telecommunications, retailing, finance and services. For the 
EU giant firm development has been overwhelmingly dominated by financial 
companies, with telecommunications growth being similar to the USA. Retailing and 
service giant firms in the EU have declined in significance. This financial dominance 
in the EU may account for the finding identified above that EU replacement giant 
firms are closer to ‘old economy dominance’ than continuing firms; the finance sector 
may be structurally part of the ‘old economy’. In terms of the definitions offered at 
the start of the discussion, a broad or systemic conception of the information economy 
would seem to be necessary to account for the evolution of EU giant firms in the new 
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era, i.e. the inter-linkages between ‘old’ and ‘new’ activities are as important as the 
‘new’ activities themselves. If this interpretation is correct, the same principle can be 
extended to the USA. Finance and retailing have played a significant role in the 
changing structure of the US giant firm population. But both sectors may be 
structurally ‘old economy’.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has presented an analysis of the potential significance of giant firms in the 
emerging information economy. The analysis has been both theoretically and 
empirically driven. In terms of general conclusions we can suggest the following. 
Using a simple cost-based theoretical framework we can identify significant potential 
impacts of an emerging information economy on giant firms. But the responses of 
‘old economy’ firms in the new environment will depend on the strategies of the 
firms. The possible differences involved were simplified into two broad types: 
neoclassical and evolutionary strategies. In addition, for information based giant firms 
we identified a potential difference between giant firm limited dominance in the early 
stages of product life cycles but potentially significant dominance at later stages.  
 In terms of empirical results the only similarity apparent for the UK, EU and 
USA is movement away from ‘old economy dominance’. But even this is qualified for 
new EU giant firms that appear to be overwhelmingly dominated by financial 
companies. For the UK results appear to be consistent with the writing of the 
sociologist Castells (1996). The changes in aggregate concentration indicate the 
development of giant firm dominated networks. In addition UK giant firms appear to 
be the primary agents of change rather than, for instance, following the competitive 
challenges from smaller firms.  
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For the USA there appears to be for the whole giant firm population a relative 
decline but when this is divided between replacement and continuing firms the decline 
is only clearly apparent for continuations. For new US giant firms a shift towards the 
UK or EU positions may be expected for two reasons. First, part of the new giant 
firms population may be structurally old economy, i.e. finance and retailing. In 
addition, for theoretical reasons we might expect a different short and long-run 
competitive challenge from smaller firms in information based industries. 
For the EU, giant firms appear to be adopting defensive strategies based on 
investment in dynamic capabilities. The key unanswered question here is whether 
such strategies are temporary or permanent. For new giant firms, the overwhelming 
dominance of the finance sector suggests a degree of permanence. More generally this 
dominance of the finance sector is consistent with the argument presented by 
Leadbetter (1999) in which non-financial giant firms are likely to be following the 
challenge from smaller firm competitors. But we can note that this conclusion appears 
not to apply to the UK and USA. Hence we cannot suggest a general evolutionary 
trajectory based on European experience. 
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Appendix One 
This appendix details the sources for the data used in the text as well as data set 
development. 
 
UK 
The main source for the UK turnover and employment company data was the Times 
1000 List of Companies (Times Books Ltd) for the years 1980 and 1998. But in 
addition various gaps in the data were covered using company accounts data. The 
gross output data for 1979 and 1997 was derived from UK input-output tables 
(Business Monitor PA1004, HMSO 1983; and Office of national Statistics, 1997). 
The denominator for the employment concentration ratios is UK total civilian 
employment, as published by Eurostat. 
 
USA 
The main source for the USA turnover and employment company data was the 
Fortune list of companies (Time Warner Publishing), but as with the UK various gaps 
in the data were covered using company accounts data. The gross output and total 
civilian employment data for 1980 and 1997 is published by the USA Federal 
Statistics Agency and downloadable from www.fedstats.gov. 
 
Europe 
The European turnover and employment company data was published in the Times 
1000 List of Companies (Times Books Ltd). The turnover data was available for 1980 
and 1997 the employment data was only available from 1990. To construct the gross 
output denominators of the turnover concentration ratios European Union input-
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output tables were used, as supplied by Eurostat. These were available for 1980 and 
1995 for Denmark, West Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal i.e. 
the EU7 countries used in the text. To extrapolate the data from 1995 to 1997 the 
growth in GNP at current prices between 1995-97 for each of the seven countries was 
used (separately) as an adjustment factor. For complete accuracy this procedure 
assumes that the input-output structure of the economies is unchanged over the 1995-
97 period. The calculated 1980 and 1997 gross output for each of the seven countries 
was transformed from ECUs to £s using the relevant average exchange rate for the 
year. The GNP and exchange rate data is supplied by Eurostat. The denominator of 
the employment concentration ratios uses total civilian employment in the EU7 
countries. For Germany the 1997 employment data were adjusted to control for the 
unification of East and West Germany by using the average ratio of the old West 
German to total German employment for the years 1991, 92 and 93 as published in 
the OECD Economic Outlook. This average is 0.78. 
 The EU12 countries are EU7 + Austria, Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, 
Sweden. For the EU12 countries input-output data are available 1995. The adjustment 
to 1997 used the same principles as just outlined. The non-availability of the 1980 
data was overcome as follows. For 1997 the ratio of gross output of each of the five 
additional European countries to the EU7 1997 gross output was computed. This ratio 
was used to impute the 1980 gross output of the five additional countries using the 
EU7 1980 total gross output. Basically this procedure assumes that the relative 
positions of the five additional countries compared to the EU7 countries was 
unchanged over the 1980-97 period. The EU12 employment concentration ratios were 
calculated for comparative purposes using readily accessible Eurostat and OECD data 
as just outlined. 
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Appendix Two 
This appendix sets out a simple framework that identifies the determinants of 
aggregate concentration. The logic is similar to that used by Clarke and Davies 
(1983). But two key differences are: (1) that an aggregate concentration ratio is used 
here rather than an aggregate Herfindahl index; and (2) the framework used here uses 
actual firm size rather than size in a particular economy. 
 We can define xi as the size of the i’th firm and X as the size of the total 
(home) economy. After ranking xi from large to small, the 100 firm aggregate 
concentration ratio can be defined as 
 C100 = ∑
=
100
1i
ixX
1  
Each firm can be viewed as producing in N different product market areas. The size of 
the i’th firm in the j’th product market is xij. Using xi1 as the largest activity, it 
follows that 
 xi = xi1 +  ∑
=
N
2j
ijx
We can define the standard diversification ratio for the i’th firm 
 Di = ∑
=
N
2j
ij
i
x
x
1  
It follows that  
 xi = xi1 + xiDi
For the largest activity undertaken by the i’th firm we can identify the shares 
accounted for by the home economy (xHi1) and the non-home (global) economy (xGi1) 
 xi1 = xHi1 + xGi1
Defining Xi as the total (home) size of activity xi1
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Dividing through by total home economy size (X) 
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Summing over the largest 100 firms and re-arranging 
 C100 = ⎥⎥⎦
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It follows that the aggregate concentration ratio is determined by 
1. Market power for primary activities in the home markets of the 100 largest 
firms i.e. 
X
x
i
H
1i . 
2. The global presence for primary activities of the 100 largest firms i.e. 
X
x
i
G
1i . 
3. Weighted product diversification i.e. D
X
x
i
i
i  
4. The economic structure of the home economy i.e. 
X
Xi . 
 -39-
References 
Aaronovitch S & Sawyer MC (1975), Big business : theoretical and empirical aspects 
of concentration and mergers, London: Macmillan 
Acs Z and Audretsch D (1987), ‘Innovation in large and small firms: an empirical 
analysis’, American Economic Review, 78, 678-690 
Arthur WB (1989), ‘Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-in by 
Historical Events’, Economic Journal, 99, 116-31. 
Baran PA and Sweezy PM (1968), Monopoly capital : an essay on the American 
economic and social order, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Best M (1990), The New Competition: institutions of industrial restructuring, 
Cambridge: polity Press. 
Carlsson B (1989), ‘Flexibility and the theory of the firm’, International Journal of 
Industrial Organisation, 7, 179-203. 
Casson M (1997), Information and Organization: a new perspective on the theory of 
the firm, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Castells M (1996), The Rise of the Network Society, London: Blackwell. 
Chandler AD (1962), Strategy and structure: chapters in the history of the industrial 
enterprise, Cambridge, Mass: The M.I.T. Press. 
Chandler AD (1977), The visible hand: the managerial revolution in American 
business, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Clarke R and Davies SW (1983), ‘Aggregate Concentration, Market Concentration 
and Diversification’, Economic Journal, 93, 182-92. 
Collins NR and Preston LE (1961), ‘The Size Structure of the Largest Industrial 
Firms’, American Economic Review, 51, 986-1011. 
Cowling K (1982), Monopoly Capitalism, London: Macmillan. 
 -40-
Davies S and Lyons B (1996), Industrial Organization in the European Union, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
de Jong HW (1993) (ed), The Structure of European Industry, Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Dietrich M (1994), Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond: towards a new 
economics of the firm, London: Routledge. 
Dietrich M (2003), ‘The importance of management and transaction costs for large 
UK firms’, Applied Economics, 35, 1317-29. 
Dunne P and Hughes A (1994), ‘Age, Size, Growth and Survival: UK companies in 
the 1980s’, Journal of Industrial Economics, 42, 115-40. 
Foss N (1993), ‘Theories of the firm: contractual and competence perspectives’, 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 3, 126-44. 
Freeman C and Perez C (1988), ‘Structural crises of adjustment: business cycles and 
investment behaviour’, in Dosi G, Freeman C, Nelson R, Silverberg G, Soete 
L (eds), Technical Change and Economic Theory, London: Pinter Publishers. 
Galbraith JK (1974), The New Industrial State, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 2nd 
edition. 
Hannah L (1983), The Rise of the Corporate Economy, London: Methuen, 2nd 
edition. 
Hayek F (1945), ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, American Economic Review, 
35, 519-30. 
Hirst P and Zeitlin J (1989), ‘Flexible specialisation and the competitive failure of UK 
manufacturing’, Political Quarterly, 60, 164-78. 
Hodgson GM (1993), Economics and Evolution: bringing life back into economics, 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 -41-
Hughes A and Kumar MS (1984), ‘Recent trends in aggregate concentration’, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 8, 235-50. 
Jorgensen DW (2001), ‘Information technology and the U.S. Economy’, American 
Economic Review, 91, 1-32. 
Kornai J (1971), Anti-Equilibrium: on economic systems theory and the tasks of 
research, Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Knight FH (1921), Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Boston : Houghton Mifflin. 
Kumar MS (1985), ‘Growth, acquisition activity and firm size: evidence from the 
United Kingdom’, Journal of Industrial Economics, 33, 327-38. 
Langlois RN and Robertson PL (1995), Firms, Markets and Economic Change: a 
dynamic theory of business institutions, London: Routledge. 
 Leadbetter C (1999), Living on Thin Air: the new economy, London: Viking. 
March JG  and Simon HA (1958), Organizations, London: John Wiley & Sons. 
Milgrom P and Roberts J (1990), ‘The economics of modern manufacturing 
technology, strategy and organization’, American Economic Review, 80, 511-
28. 
Penrose ET (1980), The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
2nd edition. 
Piore M and Sabel C (1984), The Second Industrial Divide: prospects for prosperity, 
New York: Basic Books. 
Prais SJ (1976), The Evolution of Giant Firms in Britain, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Pyke F and Sengenberger W (eds) (1992), Industrial Districts and Local Economic 
Regeneration, Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies. 
 -42-
Sengenberger W et al (1990), The Re-emergence of Small Enterprises: Industrial 
Restructuring in Industrialised Countries, Geneva: International Institute for 
Labour Studies. 
Shapiro C and Varian H (1999), Information rules: a strategic guide to the network 
economy, Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School. 
Scherer FM and Ross D (1990), Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
Simon HA (1991), ‘Organizations and Markets’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 
25-44. 
Stiglitz JE (2003), The Roaring Nineties: seeds of destruction, London: Allen 
Lane/Penguin Books. 
White LJ (1981), ‘What has been happening to aggregate concentration in the United 
States?’, Journal of Industrial Economics, 29, 223-30. 
White LJ (2002), ‘Trends in Aggregate Concentration in the United States’, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 16, 137-60. 
Williamson OE (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Anti-Trust 
Implications: a study in the economics of internal organization, New York: 
Free Press. 
Williamson OE (1981), ‘The modern corporation: origins, evolution, attributes’, 
Journal of Economic Literature, 19, 1537-68. 
Williamson OE (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: firms, markets, 
relational contracting, London: Macmillan. 
 -43-
Figures 
Figure 1 
         
               Firm       
               Costs 
 
                                                   AC2
                                    AC1
          
                     
                                          
                               APC1   
                    APC2
          
         
                                                                                                 AOC2                       
                                                                                                 AOC1
                                                                         Q1      Q*       Firm output 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
        Firm       
        Costs 
                                      AC’ 
 
                                  ACS                        
 
          
                     
                                          
                                  
                       
         APCS
         APCL
                                                                                                 AOCS
                                     QS                QL       Firm output 
 -44-
Figure 3 
         
            Firm       
        Costs 
                                               ACL
 
                                                          
 
            ACS       
                     
                                          
                                  
                       
            QS     Q’                  QL       Firm output 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
   Output 
Concentration 
 
  Increase  Decrease 
 Increase (1) 
Old economy 
dominance 
 (4) 
Giant firm 
defensive 
strategies 
Input 
Concentration 
    
 Decrease (3) 
Giant firm 
dominated 
networks 
 (2) 
Relative 
decline of giant 
firms 
 
 -45-
Figure 5 
   Output 
Concentration 
 
  Increase  Decrease 
 Increase  
Old economy 
dominance 
 EU 
Giant firm 
defensive 
strategies 
Input 
Concentration 
    
 Decrease UK 
Giant firm 
dominated 
networks 
 USA 
Relative decline 
of giant firms 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
    
   Output 
Concentration
 
  Increase  Decrease 
 Increase  
Old economy 
dominance 
EUrep EUcon 
Giant firm 
defensive strategies 
Input 
Concentration 
   
USrep
 
 Decrease UK 
Giant firm 
dominated 
networks 
 UScon 
Relative decline of 
giant firms 
 
 -46-
Tables 
Table 1a 
UK Turnover and Employment Concentration
  Turnover    Employment  
 1979 1997 change  1979 1997 change 
C20 0.179 0.181 0.002  0.133 0.083 -0.051 
C50 0.256 0.289 0.033  0.209 0.140 -0.069 
C100 0.327 0.386 0.059  0.272 0.191 -0.081 
 
Table 1b 
USA Turnover and Employment Concentration
  Turnover    Employment  
 1980 1997 change  1980 1997 change 
C20 0.167 0.111 -0.056  0.058 0.042 -0.016 
C50 0.244 0.175 -0.069  0.088 0.066 -0.022 
C100 0.316 0.244 -0.072  0.119 0.086 -0.033 
 
Table 1c 
EU7 Turnover and Employment Concentration
  Turnover    Employment  
 1980 1997 change  1990 1997 change 
C20 0.079 0.047 -0.032  0.047 0.047 0.000 
C50 0.119 0.081 -0.038  0.075 0.078 0.003 
C100 0.148 0.112 -0.036  0.094 0.102 0.008 
Note: EU7 countries are Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, and 
Portugal. 
 
Table 1d 
EU12 Turnover and Employment Concentration 
  Turnover    Employment  
 1980 1997 change  1990 1997 change 
C20 0.070 0.041 -0.029  0.041 0.041 0.000 
C50 0.108 0.071 -0.037  0.067 0.069 0.002 
C100 0.139 0.100 -0.039  0.086 0.092 0.006 
Note: EU12 countries are EU7 plus Austria, Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg and 
Sweden. 
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 Table 2a 
Giant Firm Employment (numbers of employees) 
 
 Max Min Range Mean Median 
UK 1979 410,977 21,943 389,034 68,300 47,261 
UK 1997 306,000 18,318 287,682 50,779 42,501 
UK change -104,977 -3,625 -101,352 -17,521 -4,760 
      
USA 1980 1,044,041 48,974 995,067 118,330 82,775 
USA 1997 728,000 26,200 701,800 110,835 79,363 
USA change -316,041 -22,774 -293,267 -7,495 -3,412 
      
EU7 1990 374,217 26,015 348,202 90,794 57,252 
EU7 1997 378,800 33,260 345,540 98,655 70,141 
EU7 change 4,583 7,245 -2,662 7,861 12,889 
      
EU12 1990 374,217 30,379 343,838 95,752 65,863 
EU12 1997 378,800 37,214 341,586 101,212 73,639 
EU12 change 4,583 6,835 -2,252 5,460 7,776 
 
 
Table 2b 
Giant Firm Sales (£m, current prices)1
 
 Max Min Range Mean Median 
UK 1979 22,706 574 22,132 1,866 1,122 
UK 1997 44,731 2,113 42,618 5,887 4,180 
      
USA 1980 43,247 2,018 41,229 5,273 3,359 
USA 1997 108,775 8,244 100,531 18,402 13,311 
      
EU7 1980 23,770 773 22,997 2,910 1,786 
EU7 1997 82,079 6,181 75,898 15,009 10,716 
      
EU12 1980 23,770 998 22,772 3,093 1,938 
EU12 1997 82,079 6,721 75,358 15,213 11,001 
Note: 1. All non-UK sales data is transformed into £s using average exchange rates 
for the relevant year. 
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Table 3 
Exits from the top 100 firms1
 
 UK  USA EU7 EU12  
 Rev Emp Rev Emp Rev Emp Rev Emp 
Number 46 42 59 57 46 29 52 33 
No / yr 2.6 2.3 3.5 3.4 2.7 4.1 3.1 4.7 
Note: 1. Rev = firm size measured by turnover. Emp = firm size measured by 
employment. 
 
Table 4 
Turnover and Employment Annual Average Percentage Growth Rates1
 UK USA EU7 EU12 
Average giant firm 
turnover growth 
11.97 8.22 24.46 23.05 
Gross output 
growth  
9.29 12.40 34.39 34.39 
     
Average giant firm 
employment growth  
-1.43 -0.38 1.24 0.81 
Total employment 
growth 
0.32 1.79 -0.01 -0.11 
Note: 1. Growth is defined as xt/xt-1 where x is turnover, gross output, or 
employment, as relevant, and the interval t, t-1 is the relevant data interval. 
Source: See appendix 1. 
 
 
Table 5a 
UK C100: births/deaths decomposition 
  Turnover   Employment  
 Contin-
uations 
Deaths/ 
births 
total Contin-
uations 
Deaths/ 
births 
total 
1979 0.221 0.105 0.327 0.166 0.106 0.191 
1997 0.252 0.134 0.386 0.128 0.063 0.272 
       
Change 0.031 0.028 0.059 -0.038 -0.043 -0.081 
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Table 5b 
USA C100: births/deaths decomposition
  Turnover   Employment  
 Contin-
uations 
Deaths/ 
births 
total Contin-
uations 
Deaths/ 
births 
total 
1980 0.182 0.134 0.316 0.070 0.049 0.119 
1997 0.133 0.111 0.244 0.049 0.037 0.086 
       
Change -0.050 -0.023 -0.072 -0.021 -0.013 -0.034 
 
Table 5c 
EU7 C100: births/deaths decomposition
  Turnover   Employment  
 Contin-
uations 
Deaths/ 
births 
total Contin-
uations 
Deaths/ 
births 
total 
1980/90 0.115 0.034 0.148 0.080 0.014 0.094 
1997 0.071 0.041 0.112 0.083 0.019 0.102 
       
Change -0.044 0.007 -0.037 0.003 0.005 0.008 
 
Table 5d 
EU12 C100: births/deaths decomposition 
  Turnover   Employment  
 Contin-
uations 
Deaths/ 
births 
total Contin-
uations 
Deaths/ 
births 
total 
1980/90 0.100 0.039 0.139 0.070 0.016 0.086 
1997 0.058 0.042 0.100 0.073 0.019 0.092 
       
Change -0.042 0.002 -0.039 0.003 0.003 0.006 
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Table 6a 
UK Giant Firm Mobility by activity
 
 
Activity 
              Exits
turnover 
Entrants
turnover
Exits
employment 
Entrants
employment 
 
 No.      % total
exit 
turnover 
 % top 
100 
No. % total
entrant 
turnover 
% top 
100 
 No. % total exit 
employment 
% top 
100 
No. % total
entrant 
employment 
 % top 
100 
Mining, petroleum 
 
5            17.0 5.5  2 14.9 5.8 1 6.0 2.0
Metals, rubber, 
paper, plastics, 
glass 
7               14.0 4.5 4 5.6 1.9 6 10.4 4.0 2 2.6 0.9
Engineering, 
vehicles, aero, 
div. industrial 
12               21.9 7.0 3 7.8 2.7 13 27.4 10.7 2 4.9 1.6
Electrical/office/ 
industrial equip 
               
Textiles, fibres 
 
             4 7.4 2.9  
Food, drink, 
tobacco, pharm. 
9               16.9 5.4 6 13.6 4.7 7 13.0 5.1 8 18.7 6.2
Telecomms 
 
               1 7.2 2.5 1 1.0 0.4 1 8.1 2.7
Trans., utilities, 
construction 
2               11.7 3.8 13 22.3 7.6 3 16.6 6.5 10 18.1 5.9
Retailing, 
wholesaling 
7               11.5 3.7 7 12.8 4.4 4 4.2 1.6 9 22.0 7.2
Finance 
 
3               5.8 1.9 8 25.1 8.6 1 2.4 0.9 4 5.7 1.9
Services 
 
1               1.2 0.4 4 5.6 1.9 1 2.7 1.1 5 13.9 4.6
                
Total 46               100 32.2 46 100 34.4 42 100 39.0 42 100 33.0
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Table 6b 
USA Giant Firm Mobility by activity 
 
 
Activity 
              Exits
turnover 
Entrants
turnover 
Exits
employment 
Entrants
employment 
 
 No.   % total
exit 
turnover 
 % 
top 
100 
No. % total
entrant 
turnover 
 % 
top 
100 
 No. % total exit 
employment 
% 
top 
100 
 No. % total entrant 
employment 
% 
top 
100 
Mining, petroleum 
 
17            45.6 19.1 4 8.1 3.7 4 5.9 2.4 4 2.9 1.2
Metals, rubber, 
paper, plastics, 
glass, chemicals 
14             18.0 7.5 13 21.2 8.8 5 7.0 3.0
Engineering, 
vehicles, aero, 
div. industrial 
3               3.4 1.4 2 2.2 1.0 5 6.9 2.9 2 2.2 1.0
Electrical/office/ 
industrial equip 
7           12.1 5.1 5 10.8 4.9  10 26.0 10.8 4 5.7 2.4
Textiles, fibres 
 
               
Food, drink, 
tobacco, pharm. 
8               9.2 3.9 7 9.4 4.3 13 17.5 7.2 9 11.9 5.1
Telecomms 
 
            8 12.0 5.5    7 10.5 4.5
Trans., utilities, 
construction 
4               4.8 2.0 4 4.7 2.1 5 9.3 3.8 4 5.6 2.4
Retailing, 
wholesaling 
5               5.9 2.5 9 19.7 9.0 6 11.5 4.8 8 31.5 13.6
Finance 
 
1           1.0 0.4  15 26.4 12.0 1 1.7 0.7 9 9.1 3.9
Services 
 
            5 6.7 3.1    5 13.6 5.9
                
Total 59              100 41.9 59 100 45.6 57 100 41.4 57 100 43.0
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Table 6c 
EU7 Giant Firm Mobility by activity
 
 
Activity 
            Exits
turnover 
 Entrants
turnover 
Exits
employment
Entrants
employment 
 
 No.     % total
exit 
turnover 
 % top 
100 
No. % total
entrant 
turnover 
% top 
100 
 No. % total exit 
employment 
% top 
100 
No. % total
entrant 
employment 
 % top 
100 
Mining, petroleum 
 
3            6.3 1.4 1 2.4 0.9 3 6.4 1.0  
Metals, rubber, 
paper, plastics, 
glass, chemicals 
12              32.0 7.3 2 3.7 1.4 8 20.0 3.0 2 6.0 1.1
Engineering, 
vehicles, aero, 
div. industrial 
6              14.4 3.3 3 4.5 1.7 3 11.1 1.7 3 7.1 1.3
Electrical/office/ 
industrial equip 
4            6.7 1.5  1 3.2 0.5  1 2.5 0.5
Textiles, fibres 
 
1            1.6 0.4   
Food, drink, 
tobacco, pharm. 
4            8.8 2.0 1 1.2 0.4  2 4.2 0.6  1 4.1 0.8
Telecomms 
 
2              3.9 0.9 4 15.1 5.6 2 15.1 2.8
Trans., utilities, 
construction 
5              8.9 2.0 3 5.9 2.2 7 32.3 4.9 3 9.4 1.7
Retailing, 
wholesaling 
9              17.4 4.0 3 5.6 2.1 3 9.8 1.5
Finance 
 
           29 61.6 22.7   17 55.8 10.4
Services 
 
            2 13.0 2.0  
               
Total 46          100 22.8 46 100 37.0  29 100 15.2  29 100 18.6
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Table 6d 
EU12 Giant Firm Mobility by activity 
 
 
Activity 
            Exits
turnover 
 Entrants
turnover 
Exits
employment
Entrants
employment 
 
 No.     % total
exit 
turnover 
 % top 
100 
No. % total
entrant 
turnover 
% top 
100 
 No. % total exit 
employment 
% top 
100 
No. % total
entrant 
employment 
 % top 
100 
Mining, petroleum 
 
6            13.2 3.7 1 2.1 0.9 2 4.9 0.9  
Metals, rubber, 
paper, plastics, 
glass, chemicals 
19              36.6 10.4 2 3.2 1.4 8 19.0 3.5 4 9.2 1.9
Engineering, 
vehicles, aero, 
div. industrial 
6            15.2 4.3 4 5.6 2.3  3 8.7 1.6  4 8.3 1.7
Electrical/office/ 
industrial equip 
4            5.4 1.5  3 7.8 1.4  1 2.2 0.5
Textiles, fibres 
 
1            1.2 0.3   
Food, drink, 
tobacco, pharm. 
2            4.5 1.3 2 4.4 1.9  1 2.6 0.5  2 5.4 1.1
Telecomms 
 
2              2.9 0.8 5 14.6 6.1 1 2.5 0.5 2 13.1 2.7
Trans., utilities, 
construction 
3            4.9 1.4 5 8.3 3.5  8 33.0 6.1  5 14.0 2.9
Retailing, 
wholesaling 
9              16.1 4.5 5 7.4 3.1 5 11.3 2.1 1 2.7 0.6
Finance 
 
           28 54.4 22.8   14 45.1 9.4
Services 
 
            2 10.2 1.9  
               
Total 52          100 28.2 52 100 42.0  33 100 18.5  33 100 20.8
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Table 7 
Changing structure of giant firm populations. 
 
 
Activity 
               Turnover  Employment 
              UK USA EU7 EU12  UK USA EU7 EU12
 No. %        No. % No. % No. %  No. % No. % No. % No. %
Mining, 
petroleum 
-5                 -17.0 -13 -37.5 -2 -3.9 -5 -11.1 -1 -8.9 0 -3.0 -3 -6.4 -2 -4.9
Metals, rubber, 
paper, plastics, 
glass, chemicals 
-3                 -8.4 -14 -18.0 -10 -28.3 -17 -33.4 -4 -7.8 -8 -14.2 -6 -14.0 -4 -9.8
Engineering, 
vehicles, aero, 
div. industrial 
-9                 -14.1 -1 -1.2 -3 -9.9 -2 -9.6 -11 -22.5 -3 -4.7 0 -4.0 +1 -0.4
Electrical/office/ 
industrial equip 
                 -2 -1.3 -4 -6.7 -4 -5.4 -6 -20.3 0 -0.7 -2 -5.6
Textiles, fibres 
 
                 -1 -1.6 -1 -1.2 -4 -2.9
Food, drink, 
tobacco, pharm 
-3                 -3.3 -1 0.2 -3 -7.6 0 -0.1 +1 +5.7 -4 -5.6 -1 -0.1 +1 +2.8
Telecomms 
 
+1                 +7.2 +8 +12.0 +2 +11.2 +3 +11.7 0 +7.1 +7 +10.5 +2 +15.1 +1 +10.6
Trans., utilities, 
construction 
+11                 +10.6 0 -0.1 -2 -3.0 +2 +3.4 +7 +1.5 -1 -3.7 -4 -22.9 -3 -19.0
Retailing, 
wholesaling 
0                 +1.3 +4 +13.8 -6 -11.8 -4 -8.7 +5 +17.8 +2 +20.0 -3 -9.8 -4 -8.6
Finance 
 
+5                 +19.3 +14 +25.4 +29 +61.6 +28 +54.4 +3 +3.3 +8 +7.4 +17 +55.8 +14 +45.1
Services 
 
+3           +4.4 +5 +6.7  +4 +11.2 +5 +13.6 -2 -13.0 -2 -1.9
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